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TRUTH IN BROADCASTING ACT: CAN IT MOVE
THE MEDIA AWAY FROM INDOCTRINATING
AND BACK TO INFORMING?
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent news story on prescription drug benefits narrated by public
relations consultant Karen Ryan included an "interview" with Tommy
Thompson, former Secretary of Health and Human Services.' The video
concluded with Karen's "typical sign-off: 'In Washington, I'm Karen Ryan
reporting.' '2 This segment was distributed by CNN's video feed service
and aired in forty of the nation's largest television markets.3 The Medicare
Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Acts were debated for
nearly six years.4 Despite the hotly contested issue, the news story made
no mention of the proposed prescription drug plan's vocal critics and, more
importantly, it failed to disclose that it was written, filmed, and edited by
the United States government, rather than the private sector.
The 109th Congress drafted the Truth in Broadcasting Act (the "Act")
in an effort to end the government's common use of video news releases
("VNRs") to disseminate biased information on its political agendas.6
VNRs are complete, ready-to-use audio or video news segments produced
"in the same manner as television news stations produce materials for their
own news segments."7 The fact that VNRs are intentionally designed to be
indistinguishable from independently produced news segments should
alarm the public because government propaganda becomes
indistinguishable from the news. Moreover, the fact that the press silently
serves as a distributor for government propaganda can be viewed as a
violation of Americans' First Amendment rights of free speech and
1. See David Barstow & Robin Stein, Under Bush, a New Age of Prepackaged News, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at Al.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See Understanding the New Medicare Drug Coverage Law, POL'Y ADVISORY (Nat'l
Assoc. of State Directors of Developmental Disabilities Services, Alexandria, Va.), Sept. 13,
2004, at 1.
5. See Barstow & Stein, supra note 1.
6. See generally Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005, S. 967, 109th Cong. (2005).
7. Id.
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freedom of the press. These mounting concerns motivated Congress to
draft the Truth in Broadcasting Act.8 This proposed legislation will protect
the integrity of the First Amendment by making news stations accountable
for VNRs from government agencies. 9 Specifically, the Act will force
networks to disclose the source of each prepackaged news stories.10
However, some broadcasters argue that the Truth in Broadcasting Act
will infringe on their First Amendment rights." Specifically, broadcasters
fear that the disclaimer requirement would chill the use of any information
provided by the government. 12  This conceivably could result in an
unbalanced reporting of critical issues.
Despite these concerns, the Truth in Broadcasting Act should be
passed because it will restore broadcast media's role of supplying
independent news stories. Further, contrary to some broadcaster's
assertions, the Act does little to increase the regulatory burden on
broadcasters. Instead, it relies on the existing penalties of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 to mandate disclosure of government sources
during the use of government-supplied VNRs.13 As Justice Bork stated,
"the concerns of the First Amendment only extend to the 'discovery and
spread of political truth."",14  Since neither of these concerns includes
protecting political VNRs disguised as news stories, the Act will properly
uphold the First Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of the press.
This Comment begins by tracing the United States government's
historical and current practices of using the media to promote its agenda.
Part II will explore and rebut the broadcasters' principle contention that
their First Amendment rights would be violated by the Truth in
Broadcasting Act. Next, Part III will lay out prior legislation aimed at
regulating broadcasters and explain why the Truth in Broadcasting Act is
needed. In Part IV, this Comment will analyze possible deficiencies of the
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. S. Rep. No. 109-2 10, at 1 (2005); see also S. 967.
11. Truth in Broadcasting Act: Hearing on S. 967 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci.
& Transp., 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Truth in Broadcasting Act Hearing] (testimony of
Douglas Simon, President and CEO of D S Simon Productions, Inc.).
12. Id.
13. S. REP. No. 109-210, at 1 (2005) ("[tlhe purpose of S. 967 is to amend the
Communications Act of 1934 to ensure that Federal Government-produced pre-packaged news
stories contain announcements that inform viewers that the information within was provided by
the United States Government").
14. Peter Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 31 (1971-72) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
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Act and propose potential additions to the Truth in Broadcasting Act. Part
V of this Comment will examine what Congress is willing to do to ensure
the federal government is held accountable for deceiving the American
public and how additional legislation will compliment the Truth in
Broadcasting Act. Finally, this Comment will conclude with an
endorsement of the Truth in Broadcasting Act.
II. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S BACKGROUND As A SPIN
MACHINE
A. The Price of Publicity is Steep
According to one estimate, the Bush administration spent over $250
million on commercial public relations contracts during its first term-
nearly double what the second Clinton administration spent.1 5  This
spending has paid for controversial public outreach strategies, including
secret columnist contracts and distribution of VNRs supplied by
undisclosed federal agencies. 16 In a recent example, the Department of
Education awarded a $240,000 contract to Armstrong Williams, a
prominent black pundit, to promote the No Child Left Behind Act
("NCLB") in African-American communities.17  In fulfillment of the
contract, Williams regularly mentioned the NCLB during his broadcasts
and "interview[ed] Education Secretary Roger Paige for [television] and
radio spots that aired during [Williams' 2004 show].' 8  "Williams'
contract was part of a $1 million dollar deal with Ketchum," a public
relations firm "that produced [VNRs] designed to look like news reports."' 9
The problem with the contract was that it used tax dollars to persuade
American taxpayers to support the government's political agenda. By
lobbying with public money, the government violates Congress'
prohibition on propaganda.2z
15. Barstow & Stein, supra note 1.
16. See generally id. (describing widespread use of video news releases by Bush
administration).
17. See Greg Toppo, Education Department Paid Commentator to Promote Law, USA
TODAY, Jan. 7, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-01-06-
williams-whitehousex.htm.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
2007]
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Prior to the Williams incident, the Bush administration hired
syndicated columnist Maggie Gallagher to "push for a $300 million
initiative encouraging marriage as a way of strengthening families" in her
syndicated column. 21  Gallagher also "had a $21,500 contract with the
Department of Health and Human Services to help promote Bush's
proposal. 22 In addition, Gallagher "received an additional $20,000 from
the Bush Administration in 2002 and 2003 for writing a report, titled 'Can
Government Strengthen Marriage?,' for a private organization called the
National Fatherhood Initiative., 23 The public should be alarmed when the
federal government can award contracts to privately employed journalists
since the journalists then have an explicit conflict of interest. Specifically,
to whom do these journalists owe their loyalty? On the one hand, their role
is to promote a "marketplace of ideas" 24 by collecting information and
informing the American public. On the other hand, they have become
government contractors hired to promote their employers' agenda.
The Bush administration is not alone in this practice. In 1983, during
the height of the Iran-Contra scandal, the State Department established the
Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean.25 The
office's role was to inform the public about the Reagan administration's
policies in Central America.26 While the State Department did conduct
news briefings, it also engaged in what an internal State Department
memorandum described as "white propaganda. 27 To ensure the secrecy of
the State Department's operations, the memorandum explained that the
office would "not communicate its activities on a regular basis to its
Director of Communications. 28 The memorandum then described how the
State Department made anonymous arrangements for a Nicaraguan
29opposition leader to appear on various news stations. In addition, the
memorandum documented the office's contracts with journalists and
academics to prepare op-ed columns critical of the Nicaraguan
21. Howard Kurtz, Writer Backing Bush Plan Has Gotten Federal Contract, WASH. POST,
Jan. 26, 2005, at C1.
22. Id.
23. Id. at C4.
24. See generally Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984
DUKE L.J. 1, 12 (1984) (stating marketplace of ideas is essential to democratic society and
justifies freedom of press).
25. See In re To the Honorable Jack Brooks, B-229069 at 1 (U.S. Gen. Accountability
Office Sep. 30, 1987) (discussing in detail activities of this office).
26. See id.
27. See id. at 2.
28. See id. at 3.
29. See id.
TRUTH IN BROADCASTING ACT
government's arms build-up. 30 One such op-ed, "Nicaragua is Armed for
Trouble," appeared in the Wall Street Journal under the byline of Rice
University Professor John Guilmartin. 31 The tagline made no mention of
Guilmartin's government contract.
32
More recently, the Clinton administration was able to bring the
government spin machine into American households. In an attempt to gain
support for its anti-drug campaign, the White House's Office of National
Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP") was given a $1 billion dollar budget for a
print and television anti-drug advertising campaign. 33  The government
offered to purchase ads from television networks and the print media at
half-price.34 To further entice networks to sign up, the government made
the following offer: if the networks inserted government approved anti-
drug messages into their shows, they did not have to run the ONDCP ads at
all and could resell the time already underwritten by Congress to private
advertisers.35 The same deal was offered to print publications.36 Many
outlets capitalized on the deal, and the White House was allowed to pre-
approve scripts for shows such as ER and Beverly Hills 90210.
37
In response to the government's continued intrusion of Americans'
living rooms, the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Law
filed a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC"). 38 The complaint alleged that the networks' failure to reveal the
government as a sponsor of their shows violated FCC disclosure rules. 39 In
December 2000, the FCC ruled that "listeners [and viewers] are entitled to
know by whom they are being persuaded. ' 4° The FCC chided the networks
for not being candid with their viewers, but stopped short of fining the
networks because the arrangement did not technically break the law.4 1 Six
30. See id. at2.
31. See In re To the Honorable Jack Brooks, B-229069 at 1 (U.S. Gen. Accountability
Office Sep. 30, 1987).
32. See id.
33. See Daniel Forbes, Prime-Time Propaganda, SALON, Jan. 13, 2000,
http://dir.salon.com/news/feature/2000/01/13/drugs/index.html.
34. See id.
35. See Alex Kuczinski & Marc Lacey, United States Office Encourages Antidrug Message
in Magazines, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2000, at A7 (discussing appearance of government-vetted
anti-drug themes in print publications).
36. See Forbes, supra note 33.
37. See Marc Lacey with Bill Carter, In Trade-Off With TV Networks, Drug Office Is
Reviewing Scripts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2000, at Al; see also Kuczinski & Lacey, supra note 35.
38. FCC Action Letter, 16 F.C.C.R. 1421, 1421 (2000).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
2007]
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months after President Clinton was out of office, the Bush administration
discretely ended the ONDCP program.4 2
The Bush administration appears to have ceased giving federal
payouts to networks for furthering the government's agenda; however, in
order to get its message out, it has invested heavily in VNRs.43 Networks
have been incorporating and airing VNRs since the early 1990s. 44  The
following is an example of the Bush administration's abuse of VNRs: a
release on prescription drug benefits was narrated by public relations
consultant Karen Ryan and included a somewhat scripted "interview" with
Tommy Thompson, then-Secretary of Health and Human Services.45 The
video ended with her typical sign-off: "In Washington, I'm Karen Ryan
reporting. ' 46 Distributed by CNN's video feed service, the segment, in full
or in part, aired in forty of the nation's largest television markets. 47 The
report made no mention of any of the law's vocal critics. 48 Even more
importantly, it failed to disclose that it was written, filmed, and edited by
the government.49  The Supreme Court's mandate that the "interests of
listeners and viewers are paramount and must override, to a certain degree,
the free speech rights of broadcasters" has been severely undercut by
broadcasters' current use of government VNRs. 5°  The Truth in
Broadcasting Act, if adopted, would reiterate broadcasters' role as public
fiduciaries with an obligation to present the views and voices representative
of their communities. 5' Otherwise, Americans will continue to receive
scripted government propaganda.
42. Daniel Forbes, The Quiet Death of Prime-Time Propaganda, SALON, June 30, 2001,
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2001/06/30/ondcp.
43. Barstow & Stein, supra note 1, at 1; see also supra Part I.
44. See David Lieberman, Fake News, TV GUIDE, Feb. 22, 1992, at 10 (providing examples
of VNRs released in early 1990s).
45. See Barstow & Stein, supra note 1, at A34 (describing the format of the interview in
which Thompson knew questions ahead of time).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. (describing the format of the interview in which Thompson knew questions
ahead of time).
49. See id.
50. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
51. CBS Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 111-12 (1973).
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III. POTENTIAL FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS
Many have interpreted the First Amendment as "creating a neutral
marketplace of ideas. 52 This marketplace theory assumes that the process
of exchanging ideas without "governmental interference will lead to the
discovery of truth, or at least the best perspectives or solutions for societal
problems. 53  Furthermore, "in order for a democracy to function
effectively, citizens whose decisions control its operation must be
intelligent and informed.,54  The freedoms of speech and press have
achieved a "preferred position" in our society.55  Furthermore, the
"people's ability to act as a sovereign has been perceived as the 'central
meaning of the First Amendment.' 56 Currently, the people's access to
unbiased information is being impeded by broadcast media's use of VNRs.
Yet broadcasters still argue that their actions are excusable and protected
under the First Amendment.
The most common argument against the passage of the Truth in
Broadcasting Act is that any mandatory regulation would violate the
broadcasters' freedom of speech. In response to broadcasters' concern, the
Supreme Court has recognized that it is dealing with two distinct free
speech protections when it applies the First Amendment to broadcast
regulation or licensing cases.57 The right to broadcast on radio and
television under the First Amendment differs from the right to speak, write,
or publish.58  Broadcasters have argued for an unabridgeable broadcast
right comparable to the right to speak, write, or publish.59 However, the
Court rejected their argument in NBC v. United States.60  The Court
observed that "freedom of utterance is abridged to [many] who ... use the
limited facilities of radio [because,] unlike other modes of expression,
radio.., is not available to all.",61 Therefore, radio is unique and is subject
52. Ingber, supra note 24, at 1.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 8 n.33 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964)).
57. Richard Gallagher, First Amendment Guaranty of Free Speech and Press as Applied to
Licensing and Regulation of Broadcast Media-Supreme Court Cases, 69 L. ED. 2D 1110, 1117
(1982).
58. Id.
59. See CBS Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Gallagher, supra note
57.
60. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
61. Id.
2007]
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to regulation.62 This same reasoning was applied in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, where the Supreme Court held that television stations must
give persons who are maligned during a broadcast a reasonable opportunity
to respond over the network.63 However, when a state statute required
newspapers to give a political candidate the right to equal space in order to
reply to criticism, the Supreme Court held that the requirement was an
unconstitutional infringement upon the freedom of the press.64 The
Supreme Court has justified the different First Amendment protection
given to broadcasters on the basis that there are limited frequencies which
can be used for broadcasting-thus, there is no question that the
frequencies must be allocated and regulated.65 Additionally, regulation of
broadcasting is permissible in order to promote the quantity and quality of
coverage of public issues.
66
In commenting on the lesser degree of First Amendment protection
afforded to radio and television, Justice Stevens stated that "broadcast
media ha[s] established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans. 67 As technology becomes more available and Americans are
much busier, their reliance on broadcast media for newsworthy information
increases.68 Justice Stevens' remark is perhaps even more applicable today
than when he wrote it in 1978. Thus, Congress is explicitly justified in
regulating broadcast media in order to protect the public's right to unbiased
information.
Broadcasters have also been unsuccessful in challenging network
decency laws on constitutional grounds.69 For example, in Gagliardo v.
United States, the appellant argued that 18 U.S.C. § 1464, which makes it a
crime to broadcast obscene language, was unconstitutional.70  In
disagreeing with appellant's contention, the Gagliardo court adopted the
following reasoning: "[i]t is well established that Congress has the power
62. Id.
63. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 374 (1969).
64. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
65. FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 426 U.S. 775, 795 (1978); see also CBS v.
Democratic Nat'l. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973) ("Broadcast media pose unique problems not
present in the traditional free speech case.... Because the broadcast media utilize a valuable and
limited public resource, there is also present and an unusual order of First Amendment values.").
66. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 426 U.S. at 800.
67. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
68. See Harris Interactive, The Harris Poll-Seven in 10 Adults Say They Watch Broadcast
News at Least Several Times a Week, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris3poll/
index.asp?PID=644 (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
69. See, e.g., Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1966).
70. See id. at 722.
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under the Commerce Clause... to impose penal sanctions on what it
considers to be morally objectionable conduct so long as ... [it] has a real
and substantial relation to the national interest.",71 Under 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
an individual who "utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than two years....,,72
The passage of this criminal statute suggests that broadcasters were
unable to regulate themselves and that Congress needed to get involved in
order to protect the moral welfare of American citizens. Such
Congressional involvement is arguably more intrusive to broadcasters than
the Truth in Broadcasting Act because it restricts the content of broadcasts,
as opposed to merely requiring disclosure of government sources. Further,
the Truth in Broadcasting Act stands on more substantive ground than do
obscenity regulations because the Act seeks to protect the public from
disguised propaganda and preserve the right to receive legitimate news, as
opposed to protecting mere moral sensibilities.
Similar to the battle against obscenity, Congress now faces the task of
protecting Americans from the onslaught of political propaganda.73 The
Truth in Broadcasting Act does not seek to censor or prevent any network
from airing a story; it simply requires the media to disclose the source of its
government provided stories.74 Instead of violating the freedom of the
press, the Act would preserve journalistic independence because it would
force networks to separate government manufactured stories from their
own stories, and possibly encourage them to cease airing the biased news
altogether. This preservation of journalistic independence could occur in
several ways: (1) by airing a disclaimer, viewers would be able to make the
decision to change the channel, which could affect ratings, or (2)
broadcasters would engage in more independent news-gathering, which
would re-establish the media's integrity. An additional side effect would
be that the public would be making informed decisions about political
propositions. The Truth in Broadcasting Act would preserve one of the
objectives of the First Amendment to facilitate the ability of the public to
discern the truth through the exchanging of ideas.75
71. Id.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1464(2000).
73. See generally Barstow & Stein, supra note 1,
74. See Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005, S.967, 109th Cong. (2005).
75. See Ingber, supra note 24, at 4.
2007]
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Clearly, Congress can justify its proposed legislation by tying it to a
valid national interest-protecting the public's interest in obtaining
unbiased news. Also, people as a whole retain their interest in free speech
by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently
with ends and purposes of the First Amendment: "It is the right of viewers
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. 7 6
Additionally, free speech and freedom of the press should not be used as a
shield to protect conduct that is, in reality, debilitating those rights. The
First Amendment prohibits the government from "abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press. 77  Further, the First Amendment promotes the
search for truth in a marketplace of ideas,78 ensures that the population is
equipped with enough information to govern itself,79 and supports citizens
to make independent decisions.80  An additional function of the First
Amendment is its check on the abuse of the government's power.81
In the past, the media has filled this role by remaining independent.82
Recently, however, the media has become the government's co-
conspirator.83 Consequently, Congress should be able to preserve the
integrity of the First Amendment, and broadcasters should be precluded
from defending their actions with the very rights they are trampling.
IV. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
The first substantial piece of legislation aimed at regulating the media
is the Federal Communications Act of 1934.84 Under that act, the FCC is
able to fine broadcasters that operate without a license. 85 Further, if a
broadcaster violates any of the regulations, the FCC is permitted to revoke
or refuse renewal of their operating license.8 6 Since it is a privilege, not a
Constitutional right, to a license, the FCC has discretion in issuing and
76. Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 390.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
78. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[t]he
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market....").
79. See Jodie Morse, Managing the News: The History and Constitutionality of the
Government Spin Machine, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 843, 864 (2006).
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 872.
83. See id.
84. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
85. See id. §§ 501-503.
86. See id. § 312.
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denying a broadcaster's license.87 In recent years, the Supreme Court has
even upheld the FCC's regulation of the content of broadcast media.88 For
example, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Supreme Court upheld
an FCC rule that required broadcasters to provide a right of reply under
certain circumstances. 89 The regulation was justified by the scarcity of the
broadcast spectrum and the government's role in allocating frequencies.
90
The Truth in Broadcasting Act was proposed with the goal of
increasing the transparency of broadcasters' source material. 91 On April
28, 2005, Senators Lautenberg, Kerry, Clinton, Kennedy, Dorgan, Boxer,
Feingold, Akaka, and Corzine of the 109th Congress introduced the Truth
in Broadcasting Act.92 This piece of legislation seeks to "amend the
Communications Act of 1934 to ensure that prepackaged news stories
contain announcements that inform viewers that the information within was
provided by the United States Government.... The Truth in
Broadcasting Act has been drafted to acknowledge the changes in media
technology as well as the government's use of the broadcast media to
disperse and gain support for its political agenda.94 Specifically, the Truth
in Broadcasting Act seeks to add the following language to the
Communications Act of 1934:
(a) DISCLAIMER REQUIRED - Any prepackaged news story
produced by or on behalf of a Federal agency that is broadcast or
distributed by a network organization, broadcast licensee or
permitee, or multichannel video programming distributor in the
United States shall contain an announcement supplied by the
Federal agency within the prepackaged news story that
conspicuously identifies the United States Government as the
source for the prepackaged news story.
(b) Presentation. The announcement required under subsection
(a) shall be broadcast or distributed so as-
(1) to promote consistency with the announcement requirements
required under sections 317 and 507;
(2) in the case of television and other video programming-
87. See id. § 301; see also id. § 307.
88. See generally Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 401 (1969).
89. Id. at 392. (Right of reply is granted to an individual who is personally attacked during a
broadcast, or to political opponents of an endorsed candidate.).
90. Id. at 400.
91. See Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005, S. 967, 109th Cong. (2005).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id.
20071
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(A) to be visible for the entire duration of the prepackaged news
story; and
(B) to include the conspicuous display of the statement
'PRODUCED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'; and
(3) in the case of radio and other audio programming, to audibly
inform the audience of the source of the prepackaged news
story.
(c) REMOVAL OF DISCLAIMER PROHIBITED - It is
unlawful for any person to remove an announcement required by
this section.
(d) FCC TO DETERMINE NATURE OF DISCLAIMERS -
The Commission shall determine the exact design, presentation,
and additional language, if any, required for the announcements
described in subsection (a).
(e) DEFINITIONS - In this section:
(1) AGENCY 95 - The term 'agency' has the same meaning such
a term in section 551 of title 5, United States Code, and includes
the Executive Offices of the President.
(2) MULTICHANNEL VIDEO PROGRAMMING
DISTRIBUTOR - The term 'multichannel video programming
distributor' has the meaning given that term in section 602.
(3) NETWORK ORGANIZATION -
(A) TN GENERAL - The Commission shall define the term
'network organization' for purposes of this section.
(B) INCLUSION - In defining 'network organization', the
Commission shall include all entities that may provide a
prepackaged news story to a broadcast licensee.
(4) PREPACKAGED NEWS STORY - The term 'prepackaged
news story' means a complete, ready-to-use audio or video news
segment designed to be indistinguishable from a news segment
produced by an independent news organization.,
96
95. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000) ("'Agency' means each authority of the Government of the
United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not
include-the Congress, the courts of the United States, the governments of the territories or
possessions of the United States.").
96. S. 967.
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Should this bill pass, Congress will not have the ability to directly
regulate broadcasters or the government agencies that provide the VNRs.
The enforcement of the Act will come from the FCC's ability to issue fines,
engage in committee reviews, and revoke-or refuse to renew-licenses
due to violations of the Act.97
In addition, the Act is specifically aimed at prepackaged news
98stories. It does not impede the media's ability to obtain and report
information about the government in other manners, such as interviews or
press conferences. As long as the information being broadcast has come
from the independent efforts of the broadcasters, the Act would not
interfere with the broadcasters' stories in form or content.99 This limitation
reiterates the importance that Congress has placed on protecting the right of
the public to obtain accurate and unbiased information.
V. IMPACT ON THE BROADCAST FIELD
A. The Thoughts of Networks
One argument against the passage of the Truth in Broadcasting Act is
that broadcasters should be allowed to pick segments based on news
standards alone and should not be forced to change the appearance of their
broadcasts.' 00 The reference to "appearance" relates to the disclaimer
required by the Act if the broadcaster utilizes a government agency's video
news release.10 1 Yet, there is no evidence that the addition of a disclaimer
would de-emphasize the importance of what was being reported. Since the
majority of producers and reporters at TV stations know the origin of VNR
video before deciding to air it,102 adding a disclaimer would not result in
more work for the networks. Although the broadcast decision-makers may
know that the source of their stories is the government, their station
managers might not.10 3 The confusion about the origin of the story allows
some government videos to reach journalists through network news feed
97. 47 U.S.C. § 312 (2000) (Administrative Sanctions); see also 47 U.S.C. §159 (c)(1)
(2000) (Penalties for late payment).
98. S. 967 § 342(a).
99. See id. § 342(a), (b)(2)(B).
100. Truth in Broadcasting Hearing, supra note 11, (testimony of Douglas Simon, President
and CEO of D S Simon Productions, Inc.).
101. See id.; see also S. REP. No. 109-210, at 1 (2005).
102. Truth in Broadcasting Hearing, supra note 11.
103. Id.
2007]
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services. 104 Essentially, this practice suggests that the people who air the
stories might not be aware of where the news originates because they are
not in the position to approve and select what goes on the air. It is
counterintuitive that a station, being susceptible to sanctions, would not to
be more stringent in monitoring credibility and origin of its stories. In
addition, the public's interest in obtaining both sides of a controversial
issue is not served by broadcast networks' practice of airing stories from
unknown sources.
One vocal critic of the Truth in Broadcasting Act is Douglas Simon,
Chief Executive Officer of a public relations firm that has supplied pre-
packaged news stories to broadcasters.10 5 Although Simon agrees that
increased government control over news broadcasts is not the hallmark of
democracy, he does not believe that the Truth in Broadcasting Act offers
the best solution. 0 6 One complaint is that the Act "calls for the FCC to
create the design, presentation and language of a disclaimer that news
stations would be required to air throughout the entire segment."'10 7 In turn,
networks would be more concerned about the appearance of their
broadcast and less concerned about the content.'0 8 Also, "[d]epending on
the politics of the administration in power, and in their viewing area,
broadcasters may feel pressure if they run or don't run government
video."'10 9
Nonetheless, requiring broadcasters to disclose their use of
government VNRs could also relieve the pressure broadcasters feel to air or
not to air the government's video. Specifically, the government could
become less inclined to produce biased VNRs, or broadcasters could use
the requirement as a means toward justifying their decision not to use them.
It is worth mentioning that Simon aired prepackaged news stories for both
the Clinton and the Bush administrations." 0 Mandating a network to place
a disclaimer on the screen for the duration of the segment ought not to chill
news stations that are committed to accurately informing the public.
Instead, this disclaimer would require those stations that habitually air
VNRs from government agencies to rethink the methods they employ to
acquire news.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Truth in Broadcasting Hearing, supra note 11.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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According to Simon, another drawback is that the government might
"alter the format of the video it produces, to avoid disclosure
requirements." 1 ' Even "[w]orse, the government may turn to unregulated
third parties or pop-up think tanks to become the source of the video and
escape restrictions."
' 12
Having already admitted that broadcasting executives know the
source of the video tapes, it would seem nearly impossible for the
government to escape detection. The idea that a government entity would
seek media outliers to air its stories and gain support for its policies-as
opposed to admitting that a story came from its office- would defeat the
entity's purpose of inundating the public with its message. Additionally,
the government would not want to rely on a minority of viewers to promote
its policies. A license must be obtained to transmit any form of
communication to the public; 1 3 therefore, regardless of the size of the
network, it would be obligated to comply with the Act. Moreover, the FCC
would be authorized to bring an action against entities broadcasting without
a license,'1 4 thus closing off the government's alternatives to compliance
with the Act.
Another critic of the Truth in Broadcasting Act is Dan Jaffe,
Executive Vice President of the Association of National Advertisers. 115
Jaffe believes that this bill would make it difficult for networks to convey a
legitimate message without the aid of governmental VNRs. 116 His view is
founded on the fact that a pre-packaged story is not always used in its
entirety. 17  Often, the station will incorporate a segment of the
prepackaged story into another story, simply as a means of adding another
viewpoint.11 8 Disagreeing with Mr. Jaffe, Stanley Ingber's observation
seems noteworthy: "[c]ontent based restrictions leave the public with an
incomplete, and perhaps inaccurate, perception of the... political
universe., 1 9 Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the Truth in Broadcasting
Act is not an attempt to interfere with the content of the broadcast.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
114. See, e.g., United States v. McIntire, 365 F. Supp. 618, 618-19, 623 (D. N.J. 1973).
115. Doug Halonen, Vote Near on VNR Labeling: Backers Say They Have Votes to Clear
Senate Committee, TELEVISION WEEK, October 17, 2005.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. See Erica Iacono, Broadcasting Impressions, PR WEEK, May 30, 2005, at 13.
119. Ingber, supra note 24, at 9.
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An additional critique of Jaffe's position is that, if the network's
priority was to provide legitimate news messages, then the Truth in
Broadcasting Act would not exist. The reality is that news stations have
not been as concerned about the quality and reliability of their stories as
they once were. Networks have other means of obtaining alternative views
on a topic. Although not as convenient, networks could engage in
independent information gathering, which would easily cure Mr. Jaffe's
concerns.
Although Barbara Cochran, President of the Radio-Television News
Directors Association, agrees with "the need for broadcast journalists to
identify the origin of material they use from outside sources," she does not
think there should be a "legal or regulatory burden that broadcasters would
have to adhere to."' 120 Cochran's critique seems to stem from freedom of
the press concerns. Still, the Supreme Court has rejected an "unabridgeable
First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every
individual to speak, write, or publish. 12 1 In order to ensure the public's
right to have the broadcast media function in its prescribed manner of
granting access to various "social, political, esthetic, [and]
moral... ideas," regulation of broadcast media has been permitted by the
Supreme Court pursuant to the First Amendment.122 However, the Truth in
Broadcasting Act does not seek to regulate the content of the broadcast;
rather, the Act seeks to maintain the independence of the press.
123
Mandating a disclaimer does not "abridg[e] the freedom of... the
press." 1 24 As discussed previously, the Act does not attempt to instruct
broadcasters on what they can or cannot report. Instead, the aim of the act
is to educate the public as to where the news is coming from 25 Therefore,
Cochran's argument is not substantiated with concrete examples of how
broadcasters would be harmed.
120. Halonen, supra note 115.
121. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973) (quoting Red Lion Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969)).
122. See Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 390.
123. See S. REP. No. 109-210, at 1 (2005).
124. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
125. See Janel Alania, Note, The "News" From the Feed Looks Like News Indeed: On
Video News Releases, the FCC, and the Shortage of Truth in the Truth in Broadcasting Act of
2005, 24 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 229, 259 (2006); see also Molly M. Peterson, Dems Take
Aim at Video News Releases With Disclaimer, NATIONAL JOURNAL'S CONGRESS DAILY, Apr. 25,
2005.
TRUTH IN BROADCASTING A CT
If Cochran's opinion was adopted, the result would be a discretionary,
albeit strongly suggested, use of disclaimers. Broadcasters would have no
incentive to adhere to it. Moreover, if broadcast networks took it upon
themselves to disclose their government sources, there would be no need
for legislation. In essence, the networks are requesting the ability to self-
police, and so far, that has done nothing to ensure that the public's First
Amendment rights are being protected.
B. In Support of the Truth in Broadcasting Act
Broadcast licensees have an affirmative obligation to provide full and
fair coverage of public issues. 126 It is reasonable for Congress to conclude
that the public's interest in being informed requires periodic accountability
on the part of those who are entrusted with the use of broadcast
frequencies. 27 Further, Congress and the FCC have authority such that
they may conclude that licensees, not individuals merely utilizing broadcast
media, should be given the task of selecting the material to be broadcast
because licensees are responsible if the public's legitimate needs are not
met. 128  The Supreme Court has stated that, under the Federal
Communications Act of 1934, "Congress intended to permit private
broadcasting to develop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent
with its public obligations.' 29 It is "[o]nly when the interests of the public
are found to outweigh the private journalistic interests of the broadcasters
[that] government power [would be correctly] asserted within the
framework of the Act."'
130
Currently, the public's interests have been jeopardized by
broadcasters' practice of utilizing government VNRs without disclosure to
the public.' 3' Therefore, the Truth in Broadcasting Act is a measure that is
both warranted and consistent with Congress' purpose in drafting the
126. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000); see also CBS, 412 U.S. at 111 (stating that "the
broadcaster must provide free time for the presentation of opposing views if a paid sponsor is
unavailable and must initiate programming on public issues if no one else seeks to do so."
(citation omitted)).
127. See 47 U.S.C. § 151; see also CBS, 412 U.S. at 102 (explaining the difficulty of
balancing the public's right to be informed with broadcaster's First Amendment rights, but that
"Congress and its... regulatory agency have established a delicately balanced system of
regulation.").
128. See 47 U.S.C. § 151; see also CBS, 412 U.S. at 111 (acknowledging the impossibility
of recognizing all viewpoints and granting the right to exercise editorial judgment to the
broadcaster).
129. CBS, 412 U.S. at 110.
130. Id.
131. See S. REP. No. 109-210, at 7 (2005); see also lacono, supra note 118, at 12-13.
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Federal Communications Act of 1934: to ensure that the public's interest in
obtaining reliable information takes priority over broadcasters' freedom of
speech or in this case, to use any means available to compile a story.
Further, The Truth in Broadcasting Act is an effective measure
against the practice of utilizing government VNRs without adequate
disclosure. The Truth in Broadcasting Act would indirectly strengthen the
Federal Communications Act of 1934 by tightening the current weaker
standards under which broadcasters must disclose sponsorship and renew
their licenses. Currently, sections 317 and 507 of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 make the FCC responsible for overseeing
and ensuring that the entities it regulates, including broadcasters, cable
operators, and producers, provide sponsorship identification.132 However,
subsection 317(c) only requires a station to "exercise reasonable diligence"
to determine whether the party paying is the party in interest. 133 Thus, the
language of subsection 317(c) does not mandate a full-fledged investigation
by the broadcaster.' 
34
The Truth in Broadcasting Act would require broadcasters to
positively know who was providing the prepackaged stories because they
would have to disclose the source throughout the entire broadcast. 3' As a
result, the weaker standard of "reasonable diligence" would be heightened.
This heightened standard should be used because the public's right to free
speech is at stake.
Additionally, under the current law, broadcasting stations are required
to apply for a license renewal every eight years.136 The FCC grants the
application for renewal only if it determines that public interest,
convenience, and necessity will be served.' 37 With this in mind, it is noted
here that the FCC issued a release on April 13, 2006 to remind the media
that the FCC "rules are grounded in the principle that listeners and viewers
are entitled to know who seeks to persuade them.' 38 This comment by the
FCC supports the proposed piece of legislation and its heightened
132. Government Produced News Releases: Hearing on S. 967 Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Gov. Produced News Releases
Hearing] (statement of Barbara Cochran, President of Radio-Television News Directors
Association).
133. Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 317(c)).
134. Id. at 1449.
135. Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005, S. 967, 109th Cong. § 342(b)(2)(A) (2005); Alania,
supra note 125, at 238-39.
136. 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1) (2000).
137. Id. §§ 307(a), (c), 309(a).
138. Gov. Produced News Releases Hearing, supra note 132 (statement of Barbara
Cochran, President of Radio-Television News Directors Association).
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disclosure standard.
Considering the above, there is a strong argument that a failure to
comply with the heightened discloser requirement of the proposed
legislation would be a disservice to the public interest, convenience, and
necessity, and should thus bar a renewal of license. In conjunction with the
identification of sponsorship requirements mentioned above, the Truth in
Broadcasting Act would have the added effect of requiring broadcasters to
disclose government sources before they could obtain a license renewal
from the FCC. Therefore, the Truth in Broadcasting Act will strengthen
the current legislation and would place more regulatory power in the FCC.
C. Problems with Enforcement of the Truth in Broadcasting Act
An initial concern is that aside from stating it is "unlawful,"' 3 9 the bill
itself does not outline any specific repercussions for failure to disclose the
source of the pre-packaged news stories. However, the FCC, which has
jurisdiction to regulate the broadcasting industry, could potentially fine
networks or, as argued above, decide not to renew their licenses. 40 This
jurisdictional authority under the Federal Communications Act of 1934
would require the FCC to seriously enforce the legislation and not merely
to issue warnings.' 41 On the other hand, the FCC would not have the power
to discipline the government agencies providing the news because the FCC
only has authority over the broadcasters.142 Nevertheless, it is possible that
if the FCC stringently enforces the disclosure requirement by fining non-
complying broadcasters, less VNRs would be produced because
government agencies would not have as many broadcasters willing to risk
airing VNRs. However, this result is unlikely considering the
government's long-standing history of using political propaganda to further
its agenda. Instead, Congress and the FCC would have to work together to
ensure politically biased VNRs are not being produced or aired to persuade
Americans.
139. S.967.
140. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 312.
141. Id. § 151 ("There is created a commission to be known as the 'Federal
Communications Commission', which shall be constituted as hereinafter provided, and which
shall execute and enforce the provision of this chapter.") (emphasis added).
142. See generally id.
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In the past, Congress has attempted through the Government
Accountability Office ("GAO")143 to curtail government agency spending
on publicity. 144 More importantly, the GAO is responsible for enforcing
the prohibition on deceptive domestic propaganda.145  The Congressional
prohibition on propaganda has been in place since 1951.146 It states: "No
part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall be used
for publicity or propaganda purposes within the United States not heretofor
[sic] authorized by the Congress."' 147 The GAO is thought to be able to
regulate appropriations because it oversees how tax dollars are spent.
148
However, the GAO has admitted that the provision barring domestic
propaganda is difficult to enforce because the boundary between "an
agency making information available to the public and.., creating news
reports unbeknownst to the receiving audience"'149 is not entirely clear. It is
particularly difficult because the GAO is aware of an "agency's right or
duty to inform the public regarding its activities and programs."' 5 ° Yet,
over the years, the GAO has interpreted the prohibition as preventing
"covert propaganda ... materials that 'are misleading as to their origin. ' '' 5 1
The GAO reemphasized its position by stating that the "propaganda
prohibition always restrict[s] the use of appropriations to disseminate
143. In 2004, the Office underwent a name change, from the Government Accounting
Office to the Government Accountability Office. See Morse, supra note 79, at 855 n.88. The
sources cited in this Comment reflect the name of the Office at the time the relevant source was
published.
144. Id. at 859.
145. See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 4-7 (3d ed. 2004) (outlining GAO's duty to prevent government
funded propaganda).
146. See id.
147. Id. at 4-8.
148. See Video News Releases: Unattributed Prepackaged News Stories Violate Publicity or
Propaganda Prohibition: Hearing on S. 967 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.,
109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Video News Releases Hearing] (statement of Susan A. Poling,
Managing Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Office of Gen. Counsel) at 5 n.2.
149. Morse, supra note 79, at 859 (citing Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs. Video News Releases, B-302710 at 13 (U.S. Gen. Accounting
Office May 19, 2004)); see also Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003-Use of Appropriated Funds for Flyer and Print and Television Advertisements, B-
302504 at 6 (U.S. Gen. Accounting Office Mar. 10, 2004) ("Given the absence of definitional
guidance in the statute and its legislative history, we have struggled over the years to balance the
need to give meaning to this prohibition with an agency's right or duty to inform the
public .... ).
150. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003-Use of
Appropriated Funds for Flyer and Print and Television Advertisements, B-302504 at 6.
151. See id. at 8 (quoting B-223098 (U.S. Gen. Accounting Office Oct. 10, 1986)).
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information without proper source attribution."
'152
Moreover, covert propaganda includes "materials such as editorials or
other articles prepared by an agency or its contractors at the behest of the
agency and circulated as the ostensible position of the parties outside the
agency."'153 A critical element of violating the propaganda prohibition is
"concealment from the target audience of the agency's role in sponsoring
the material."' 154  This definition includes barring government agencies
from spending funds on journalist contracts and VNRs. Despite the GAO's
determination in three separate rulings that VNRs constituted "covert
propaganda,"'' 55 no further disciplinary action has yet to follow.
As Jodie Morse stated in her New York University Law Review
article, "[s]everal features of the GAO make it particularly ill-suited for
checking government publicity overreaches."'' 56  First, there is no
Congressional order requiring the GAO to hear every case of potential
appropriations violations; instead it can hand select them. 57 "Though the
GAO can initiate its own audit investigations, it must also act at Congress'
behest."' 58  "Second, it serves a purely advisory role."'' 59  "Its legal
opinions do not have any weight as precedent.' 160 "Lastly, it has no direct
enforcement power."' 16 1 "At most, [the GAO] can refer its findings to
Congress or other agencies for further investigation."'
162
Recently, the GAO reported that the Department of Health and
Human Services and the Office of National Drug Policy "illegally
produced [VNRs] which included actors posing as reporters."' 63  In
response, "[c]omptroller General David Walker wrote to all federal
152. Dep't of Educ.-No Child Left Behind Newspaper Article Entitled "Parents Want
Science Classes That Make the Grade," B-307917 at 2 (U.S. Gen. Accountability Office June 6,
2006).
153. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 4-10 (3d ed. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing B-
229257 (U.S. Gen. Accountability Office June 10, 1988)).
154. Id. at 4-10-4-11.
155. Morse, supra note 79, at 857-58.; see also Prepackaged News Stories, B-3044272, 1-3
(U.S. Gen. Accountability Office Feb. 17, 2005) (reiterating earlier rulings and calling on agency
heads to "scrutinize any proposed prepackaged news stories to ensure appropriate disclosures").
156. Morse, supra note 79, at 859.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Morse, supra note 79, at 859.
163. Kate Cyrul, Legislators Urge Appropriators to Keep Anti-Propaganda Language in
Final Supplemental Appropriations Bill, US FED NEWS, May 2, 2005.
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agencies on Feb. 17, [2005,] reiterating the GAO finding that government-
produced [VNRs] that conceal their funding sources violate the federal ban
on covert propaganda."' 64 "However, the Bush Administration has rejected
this finding and has instructed agencies that they may continue using
[VNRs] that do not disclose the source of the information."' 165  This
illustrates the problem of not being able to control the government's current
practice of creating biased news releases to further its political agenda.
Although under the proposed act the Executive Office would fall
under the definition of "agency," the FCC would only be able to regulate
stories that come from the Executive Office and get aired.' 66 The FCC is
unable to regulate the Executive Office directly. 67 Should the Executive
Office continue to bypass GAO recommendations, the FCC will have to
single-handedly enforce the disclaimer requirement of the proposed
legislation. If the FCC is able to require broadcasters to disclose
government sources, it is possible that less money will be spent on the
production of biased VNRs.
In light of recent case law, the FCC may have additional difficulty
enforcing the disclaimer requirement of the Truth in Broadcasting Act.
168
According to the D.C. Circuit Court, sponsorship identification regulations
impose a minimal duty on networks to investigate the sources and financial
backers of aired material.' 69 In Loveday v. FCC, Judge Bork's opinion
stated, "Were we to approve a stringent obligation to investigate .... [the
rule might] have the effect of choking off many political messages."'' 70 He
further stated, "Quite aside from any First Amendment difficulties that such
a rule might implicate, we are certainly not prepared to say that the public
would be benefited from a decline in the number and variety of political
messages it receives."'' 7  Although this case is not binding on all
jurisdictions, no recent case has overruled it. Perhaps the Truth in
Broadcasting Act signals Congress' disagreement with the message
emphasized in the Loveday opinion.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005, S. 967, 109th Cong. (2005).
167. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (The FCC has authority over those who broadcast the
story, not the creator of the story.).
168. See generally Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
169. See id. at 1458.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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VI. POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE BILL
One improvement for the bill would be to outline a disciplinary
process. For example, a first offense could require the FCC to warn the
station that it is in violation. The network would also have to publicly
qualify the story that was aired. For a second offense, the station could be
fined, and publicly announce it has aired government provided news. If a
broadcaster is charged with a third violation, the FCC should not renew the
network's broadcasting license. Although the third penalty appears harsh,
if broadcasters continue to insist on the fallacy that they are capable of
policing themselves, the FCC has to step in on the public's behalf. There
has been a well documented history of airing pre-packaged news stories,172
and with no regulation in place beside an honor code, the epidemic will
continue.
The networks argue that the majority of the news does not depend on
VNRs supplied by the government, nor does it use third party sources.V3
However, there remains no way for the public to decipher between
propaganda and independent journalism. Further, it seems that the
government is not the only entity using VNRs to its advantage. After a ten
month investigation, a report was issued by the Center for Media and
Democracy. 174 It revealed that "77 local TV stations around the [United
States] had presented corporate VNRs without disclosing to their viewers
that corporations provided the footage or in some cases, complete story
packages, to the stations.' ' 175  This report signals that the proposed
legislation is too narrow because it only focuses on those stories that
originate with the government. Perhaps the language needs to include pre-
packaged news stories generally, or at least those that come from sources
other than the networks themselves. Otherwise, VNRs will continue to be
used to further the interests of specific groups at the cost of the nation's
right to hear and view unbiased news.
In addition, the drafters may consider adding a private right of action.
This would serve as a safeguard should the FCC not aggressively enforce
the Truth in Broadcasting Act. A private right of action would enforce the
idea that the media should be held accountable to the public in its
performance of its primary role of furnishing unbiased news to the public.
Recognizing the problem with one-sided enforcement, Congress has
172. See Morse, supra note 79, at 857.
173. Gov. Produced News Releases Hearing, supra note 132 (statement of Barbara
Cochran, President of Radio-Television News Directors Association).
174. Erica Iacono, Latest VNR Flap Puts Onus on Media, PR WEEK, Apr. 17, 2006, at 6.
175. Id.
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proposed an additional piece of legislation aimed specifically at regulating
federal government agencies' ability to use federal funds as a means to
develop domestic propaganda.
VII. CONGRESS' ATTEMPT TO REIGN IN GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON
PROPAGANDA
Another hurdle preventing effective enforcement of the Truth in
Broadcasting Act is the ability of government agencies to discard the
rulings and recommendations of the GAO. The problem is further
frustrated by government agencies' continued practice of using federal
budgets to create propaganda. Congress realized the need for change, and
on February 2, 2005, the United States Senate introduced legislation
intended to stop taxpayer funded Government propaganda. 76  The
legislation was drafted in response to Congress' finding of numerous
violations of the 1951 prohibition of domestic propaganda. 
77
The legislation, known as the Stop Government Propaganda Act,
listed the following findings:
(2) On May 19, 2004, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) ruled that the Department of Health and Human Services
violated the publicity and propaganda prohibitions by creating
fake television new stories for distribution to broadcast stations
across the country.
(3) On January 4, 2005, the GAO ruled that the Office of
National drug Control Policy violated the publicity and
propaganda prohibitions by distributing fake television news
stories to broadcast stations from 2002 to 2004.
(4) In 2003, the Department of Education violated publicity and
propaganda prohibitions by using of taxpayer funds to create
fake television news stories promoting the 'No Child Left
Behind' program violated the propaganda prohibition.
(5) An analysis of individual journalists, paid for by the
Department of Education in 2003, which ranked reporters on
how positive their articles portrayed the Administration and the
Republican Party, constituted a gross violation of the law
prohibiting propaganda and the use of taxpayer funds for
176. See Stop Government Propaganda Act, S. 266, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
177. Id. ("No part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall be used for
publicity or propaganda purposes within the United States not heretofore authorized by
Congress.").
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partisan purposes.
(6) The payment of taxpayer funds to journalist Armstrong
Williams in 2003 to promote Administration education policies
violated the ban on covert propaganda.
(7) The payment of taxpayer funds to journalist Maggie
Gallagher in 2002 to promote Administration welfare and family
policies violated the ban on covert propaganda.
(8) Payment for and construction. of 8 little red schoolhouse
facades at the entranceways to the Department of Education
headquarters in Washington, DC to boost the image of the 'No
Child Left Behind' program was an inappropriate use of
taxpayer dollars.
(9) Messages inserted into Social Security Administration
materials in 2004 and 2005 intended to further grassroots
lobbying efforts in favor of President Bush's Social Security
privatization plan is an inappropriate use of taxpayer funds.
(10) The Department of Health and Human Services ignored the
Government Accountability Office's legal decision of May 19,
2004, and failed to follow the GAO's directive to report its Anti-
Deficiency Act violation to Congress and the President, as
provided by section 1351 of title 31, United States Code.
(11) Despite numerous violations of the propaganda law, the
Department of Justice has not acted to enforce the law or follow
the requirements of the Anti-Deficiency Act.
(12) In order to protect taxpayer funds, stronger measures must
be enacted into law to require actual enforcement of the ban on
the use of taxpayer funds for propaganda purposes. 
178
Congress included definitions of what constitutes propaganda within
the Stop Government Propaganda Act. 179 For example, a "news release or
other publication that does not clearly identify the government agency
directly;" "any audio or visual presentation that does not continuously and
clearly identify the government agency financially responsible for the
message;" and "any attempt to manipulate the news media by payment to
any journalist, reporter, columnist, commentator, editor, or news
organization" is deemed propaganda under the act. 180 These definitions of
178. Id. § 2(2)-(12).
179. Id. § 3.
180. Id. § 3(1), (2), (4).
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propaganda mirror the conduct that is meant to be regulated by the Truth in
Broadcasting Act.
A difference exists with respect to requiring disclosure of the
government agency. The Stop Government Broadcasting Act requires
disclosure by agencies that are "financially responsible,"' 181 compared with
having to disclose the government source of any prepackaged news story as
is required by the Truth in Broadcasting Act. 182 Although it does not
appear to be a big difference, it is possible for a government agency to
produce a pre-packaged news story, but not necessarily be financially
responsible for it. Therefore, both pieces of legislation are needed to cover
the different scenarios.
Further, the Stop Government Propaganda Act could aid in enforcing
the Truth in Broadcasting because it outlines a disciplinary action that can
be taken against a violator. Specifically, it holds accountable the "senior
official of an Executive branch agency who authorizes or directs funds for
publicity or propaganda purposes within the United States"' 83 By adopting
this legislation, the concern over the government's continued use of VNRs
would be resolved because the government could not escape responsibility
by ignoring an advisory opinion. Another positive aspect of the Stop
Government Propaganda Act is its allowance of a private right of action.
"A person may bring a civil action for a violation of [this act] for the
person and for the United States Government.
'' 84
Therefore, The Stop Government Propaganda Act should be adopted
in order to hold the government responsible for its role in eroding the
American public's First Amendment rights. The Truth in Broadcasting Act
would be strengthened because it would not be a one-sided regulation of
broadcasters.
181. Id. § 3(1)-(3).
182. Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005, S. 967, 109th Cong. § 342(a) (2005).
183. Stop Government Propaganda Act, S. 266, 109th Cong. § 4(a) (2005) (A violator is
"liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more
than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of funds appropriated" for the propaganda.).
184. Id. § 4(c)(1).
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VIII.CONCLUSION
The Truth in Broadcasting Act should be adopted for several reasons:
(1) it is a Constitutional exercise of Congress' legislative power; (2) it will
further the Supreme Court's determination that the First Amendment right
of the public is more important than that of the broadcaster; and (3) it will
curb broadcast media's reliance on government provided VNRs.
By continuing to conceal the government as the source, VNRs violate
the media's independence and prevent it from exposing the government's
wrongdoing. 185 As a result, the American public is losing confidence in the
media's ability to protect it from the government's domestic propaganda.
In addition, Americans are not being afforded the opportunity to evaluate
opposing opinions because the sources are hidden. The Truth in
Broadcasting Act is a step in the right direction.
Although the proposed legislation could include a more detailed set of
consequences for violating the disclaimer requirement, it can always be
amended. On the other hand, the FCC already has the authority under the
Federal Communications Act of 1934 to discipline violators with fines and
license revocation186 As long as the FCC is committed to enforcing the
disclaimer requirement, the Truth in Broadcasting Act will serve Congress'
intent of holding the broadcast media accountable for what it brings into
Americans' living rooms.
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185. Morse, supra note 79, at 872.
186. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) ("There is hereby created a commission to be known as the
'Federal Communications Commission' which shall execute and enforce the provisions of this
Act"); see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1464.
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